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COMMENTS 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION-SUSPENSION OF DEPORTA-
TION-A LooK AT A BENEVOLENT ASPECT OF THE McCARRAN-
WALTER AcT-The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is 
a reputedly harsh statute-"a bacchanalia of meanness" in the 
words of one scholar.1 It has been vetoed by a President, attacked 
on numerous occasions in the courts, and been the subject of 
criticism in law reviews2 and the halls of Congress. Yet it remains 
the basic law governing aliens in this country. 
This comment proposes to look, for a change, at one of the 
ameliorative portions of the act, the provisions which allow sus-
pension of deportation for certain deserving aliens. 3 This section 
of the statute is not only unusual in its solicitude for the foreign-
born and their families but is also effectuated by a peculiar in-
teraction of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government. Before considering the substantive law governing 
suspension of deportation, it is appropriate to look at the proce-
dural aspects involved in applying the raw statutory language.4 
I. THE SUSPENSION PROCEDURES 
When the question of suspension arises, the alien is normally 
in the charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, an 
institution which is somewhat hard to characterize. Nominally 
subordinate to the Attorney General, it actually maintains a cer-
tain amount of independence as a result of its willingness to co-
operate with those members of congressional committees, and 
their staffs, who exercise substantial authority over immigration 
matters.5 It is an administrative agency in the sense that it has 
sometimes been held subject to provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, but unlike most agencies it has the power to 
1 Hearings Before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1575 (Comm. Print 1952); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 
ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, "WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 212 (195!1) (hereinafter 
cited as WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME). 
2 See, e.g., Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLOM. 
L. REv. 309 (1956); Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 643 (1953). 
3 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), § 244, 66 Stat. 
214, 8 u.s.c. § 1254 (1958). 
4
1 
See generally Note, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 184 (1960); Note, 42 VA. L, REv. 803 {1956); 
Note, 62 YALE L.J. 1000 (1953). 
5 Report on the Administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act, H.R. REP. 
No. 1570, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955) (hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT). See also 
Maslow, supra note 2, at 343 n.261. 
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arrest and deport aliens without recourse to a court to enforce its 
orders.6 
But regardless of how it is characterized, it is the Service which 
conducts a hearing at which the alien is charged with being de-
portable on one or more of the over 700 grounds for deportation. 
If he wishes to apply for suspension, the alien must do so during 
the hearing and pay a twenty-five dollar fee.7 The hearing officer 
then treats the suspension question as part of the deportation 
hearing, and evidence is taken on both issues. 8 On the question 
of eligibility for suspension, however, the burden of proof is on 
the alien.9 The initial decision is made by the hearing officer on 
the basis of evidence presented by both sides at the hearing, but 
in some cases he may rely on confidential information presented 
by the Service which is not revealed to the alien.10 
If suspension is denied, the alien may appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.11 This is a quasi-judicial body which exists 
by the grace of the Attorney General and without statutory au-
thorization.12 Although the Attorney General may review and 
reverse decisions of the Board, he rarely does either.13 Thus de-
spite the tenuous basis for its existence, a certain amount of de 
facto independence is maintained by the Board. 
An appeal to the Board involves hazards which are not com-
mon to most other administrative tribunals. The prior decisions 
of the Board are published selectively14 and, except for rare dis-
senting opinions, anonymously.15 Sometimes the Board relies on 
prior unpublished opinions in reaching a decision,16 but appar-
ently counsel specializing in practice before the Board are familiar 
6 See Maslow, supra note 2, at !HO. See generally GORDON &: ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.4 (1959). 
7 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (Supp. 1962). 
8 8 C.F.R. § 24-4-.1 (Supp. 1962). 
9 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(d) (Supp. 1962). 
10 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (Supp. 1962). 
11 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (Supp. 1962). 
12 GORDON &: ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1.I0b. 
1s Of 600 published opinions covering the period 1947-1954, review was found in only 
thirty-five cases. Maslow, supra note 2, at 358 n.353. 
H The decisions selected are issued first as "interim decisions" and later further 
culled for publication in a series entitled ADMINISTRA.TIVE DECISIONS UNDER IMMIGRATION 
AND NATIONALITY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES (hereinafter cited as I. &: N. Dec.), now in 
eight volumes covering the period 1940-1960. Interim decisions not as yet bound in 
I.&: N. Dec. will be hereinafter cited as I. D. No. 
111 See, e.g., Matter of J., 2 I. &: N. Dec. 876 (1947). 
16 The Board does cite as precedents its own unreported opinions [Matter of A., 
I.D. No. 1145 (1961); Matter of L., 4 I. &: N. Dec. 1 (1950)) as well as unreported court 
cases. Matter of H., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 249 (1956). 
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with the use of these opinions and on occasion will themselves 
cite unpublished opinions to the Board.17 
If suspension is denied by the Board, the alien has three pos-
sible remedies. The first, reversal by the Attorney General, is 
quite unlikely.18 The second, a private immigration bill in Con-
gress, is more common but subject to all the vagaries of the polit-
ical process. Also, this method results in but slight impact, beyond 
the immediate case, on the substantive law governing suspension. 
The third remedy, judicial review, is of most immediate concern. 
At one time the alien had a variety of procedural devices by 
which he could challenge an order of deportation: habeas corpus, 
declaratory judgment19 or review under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.20 At the very end of the 1961 session of Congress a 
bill was passed, over the opposition of the A.B.A. and every other 
group which was represented at hearings on the measure,21 which 
restricted judicial review.22 As a result of this legislation the alien 
not in custody has a single remedy to be known as the petition 
for review. Venue for these petitions is in the courts of appeals. 
The reason given for removing jurisdiction from the more nu-
merous, less expensive district courts was that multiple appeals 
had been used by communists and criminals to delay deporta-
tion.23 
The remedy for this abuse seems drastic in light of the extent 
of the misuse of review. Only one percent of the formal proceed-
ings of the Immigration Service ever get into court in the first 
place.24 Commissioner of Immigration Swing found only thirty-
seven cases of multiple appeals, concededly not all mala fide, out 
of over 200,000 handled by the Service in recent years.25 The 
principal vehicle of repetitious appeals--habeas corpus-was left 
untouched by the act. .. 
But whether the grant of suspension is made at the initial hear-
17 See Matter of C., 7 I. 8: N. Dec. 608 (1957). 
18 See note 13 supra. 
19 See Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), afj'd by an equally 
divided court, 346 U.S. 929 (1954). 
20 See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955). 
21 See 11 AD. L. BuLL. 297, 309 (1959); 13 AD. L. REv. 256 (1961). See also 107 CONG. 
R.Ec. 12174 (1961). 
22 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. 1962). For the fascinating story of 
how this was accomplished, see 107 CoNG. R.Ec. 19650, 19654 (1961) (remarks of Senator 
Javits), casting light also on the whole process of enacting alien legislation. 
23 See H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1961). See, e.g., Jimenez v. Barber, 
252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1958). 
24 See H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 23, at 29. 
25 Ibid. 
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ing or as a result of judicial review, the final step is always ap-
proval by Congress.26 In the case of aliens deportable for minor 
misconduct or improprieties in entering the country, suspension 
is automatically approved, unless a joint resolution disapproving 
the suspension is passed.27 In all other cases affirmative congres-
sional action is required.28 In practice Congress plays a minor role 
in these decisions which are made for the most part by the im-
migration subcommittees or their staff members.29 
II. ELIGIBILITY FOR SUSPENSION 
In examining both its procedural and substantive aspects it is 
important to keep in mind that suspension of deportation is not 
a matter of right but lies in the discretion of the Attorney General 
and those to whom his authority is delegated. The alien must not 
only show that he meets the statutory requirements for suspension 
but must also demonstrate some reasons why the discretion granted 
should be exercised in his behalf. 
The statutory prerequisites are contained in section 244(a) of 
the act.30 This section is not merely complex; it is also a good ex-
ample of poor draftsmanship,31 standing out even in a statute 
which is not otherwise noted for lucidity.32 The reader of section 
244(a) is required to refer to other sections of the act as well as 
to portions of the repealed act of 1917. In addition he is not 
warned that several words are subject to restrictive definitions set 
out elsewhere in the act. 
The statute attempts to subject deportable aliens to two sorts 
of requirements. The first of these is a classification scheme that 
breaks down all eligible aliens into five classes, coincident with the 
five paragraphs of section 244(a). The five classes do not include 
all deportable aliens;33 if the alien cannot bring himself within 
28 GoRDON &: RosENFmr.n, op. cit. supra note 6, § 7 .9f. 
27 Under the original suspension statute this veto power applied to all suspensions. 
54 Stat. 672 (1940). 
28 The 1948 amendments required affirmative action for all suspensions. 62 Stat. 
1206 (1948), repealed by 66 Stat. 279 (1952) but re-enacted by Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952, § 244(b), 66 Stat. 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1958). 
29 See Maslow, supra note 2, at 343. 
so 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1958). 
31 See GORDON 8c ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 7.9a(3) (" •.• a pattern for 
relief that is complex and sometimes almost incomprehensible'); WHOM WE SHALL 
WELCOME 212 (" ••• an involved statutory scheme .•• even the technical experts 
have difficulty ••• understanding'). 
32 See 98 CONG. REc. 5607 (1952) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) ("a legislative 
maze trap'); WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 18 ("inferior draftsmanship'). 
33 Such as: (I) aliens expelled in exclusion proceedings, (2) aliens who entered prior 
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one of the five classes he is ineligible for suspension even though 
he may be able to meet the general standards.s4 
The general standards (e.g., hardship, good moral character) 
are applicable to all five statutory classes, with some variance be-
tween the classes as to the period of time over which the alien 
must meet the standards. 
A. The Statutory Classes 
There are five statutory classes based on a combination of 
three factors: date of entry, date of application for suspension, and 
the grounds upon which the alien is deportable. 
Class I. This class includes all aliens who last entered the 
United States before June 26, 1950, and who are deportable for 
reasons other than criminal or subversive activities. This group 
encompasses most long-time resident aliens except those least de-
serving of suspension. For these individuals application for sus-
pension must have been made before December 24, 1957, and 
they must have been otherwise eligible for suspension on that 
date.slS As a result suspension is no longer available for aliens who 
entered before June 26, 1950, unless they are criminals or sub-
versives.s6 
It becomes crucial then for the long-time resident alien to 
determine the meaning of "entry." The definition had been much 
litigateds7 prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
which now defines entry as "any coming of an alien into the 
United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying 
possession," with certain exceptions for aliens whose departure 
was involuntary.ss The Supreme Qourt has described this as a 
codification of prior case law.s9 
Class II. The second class consists of aliens who last entered 
to 1950, who are not deportable for major post-entry misconduct and who did not 
apply before December 24, 1957, (3) aliens who last entered before 1950 and were ex-
cludable at that time as criminals or subversives, and (4) natives of contiguous countries 
or adjacent islands who are eligible for a non-quota immigrant visa. See GORDON Be 
ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 7 .9c. 
34 Matter of 0., 7 I. Be N. Dec. 457 (1957); Matter of M., 5 I. 8e N. Dec. 598 (1954). 
SIS See Matter of G. L. T., 8 I. 8e N. Dec. 403 (1959). 
36 See text infra at page 369. 
37 See cases cited in Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958). 
38 Section 10l(a)(13), 66 Stat. 167 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1958). 
89 Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642 (1954) (dictum), citing: Delgadillo v. Car-
michael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947), where a sailor on intercoastal vessel was taken to Cuba 
when the ship was torpedoed; held, no entry when he returns to U.S.; Di Pasquale v. 
Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947), where alien was asleep on Buffalo-Detroit train which 
passed through part of Canada; held, no entry. See also Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1131 (1928), 
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the United States after June 26, 1950, and are deportable "solely 
for an act committed or status existing prior to or at the time 
of" his last entry. The aliens in this category are mainly those 
who were excludable under the immigration laws at the time of 
their last entry but whose entry was regular in form. The alien 
must have had all requisite entry documents at the time of his 
last entry. The Board has interpreted this last requirement so 
that if the alien was not entitled to the documents, having pro-
cured them by fraud, he is ineligible.40 
Class III. Aliens who are deportable because of minor crimi-
nal acts after their last entry and who last entered after June 26, 
1950, with all requisite documents comprise the third class of 
suspension eligibles. 
Class IV. Aliens who were excludable at their last entry as 
criminals or subversives or who entered without proper inspec-
tion or documents fall into this category. An alien who enters 
under a false claim of citizenship is included in this group.41 These 
offenders are viewed as more serious immigration violators than 
those contained in Class II and are therefore required to show 
good moral character for ten years instead of five. 
Class V. This final category is the only one available for aliens 
who last entered the United States prior to June 26, 1950. In 
order to bring himself within it, the alien must show that he is 
deportable for serious criminal acts such as dope addiction, prosti-
tution, draft-dodging or monopolizing; or that he has committed 
a serious immigration violation, such as failing to register or re-
maining longer than the period for which originally admitted;42 
or show that the Attorney General has found him to be an un-
desirable resident.43 
B. The General Requirements 
Once the alien has shown that he q-galifies in one of the four 
statutory classes to which suspension is actually presently avail-
able, he must then meet certain requirements common to all 
classes. The only variance as to such requisites between the classes 
is that those in Classes IV and V must meet the applicable standard 
for ten years while five years suffices for Classes II and III. 
40 Matter of L., '1 I. &: N. Dec. 434 (195'1); cf. Matter of H., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 416 (1953) 
[test under § 244(a)(l)]. 
41 Matter of M., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 642 (1954). 
42 See Chan Wing Cheung v. Hagerty, 2'11 F.2d 903 (1st Cir. 1959). 
43 This group includes aliens deportable under the 1952 act or any of its statutory 
predecessors. Matter of D., 6 I. &: N. Dec. 285 (1954). 
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I. Continuous Physical Presence. To be eligible for suspension, 
applicants must have been physically present within the United 
States for a period of five or ten years. At the time the act was 
passed it was felt that even a few minutes in Canada or Mexico 
would disqualify the alien. 44 Some decisions of the Board have 
reflected this thinking.45 
Exceptions, however, have been carved out by later decisions. 
The Board held that an alien serving abroad with the Army was 
physically present in the United States.46 The decision was based 
on the Board's feeling the Congress could not have intended to 
penalize an inducted alien. Where the alien left the country for 
several months as a result of false representations made by the 
Immigration Service, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held he was nonettheless eligible for suspension.47 
2. Hardship. The Act of 1940 provided that "serious econo-
mic detriment" to the deportee's family must be found before 
suspension could be granted.48 The McCarran-Walter Act changed 
this test to one of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" 
to the alien or his family. The response to this language is typi-
fied by a remark of Professor Louis L. Jaffe-"rarely has there 
been a balder statement of a national purpose to be cruel."40 
The reasoning of the drafters was that under the old language 
the officials charged with administering the act had not been severe 
enough.50 As a result, it was alleged, aliens were encouraged to 
enter illegally with the hope of eluding the Immigration Service 
until such time as they would become eligible for suspension. 51 
This practice was said to be especially prevalent in the case of 
aliens from countries with oversubscribed immigration quotas. 
Since suspensions are charged off against the quota of the aliens' 
homeland, the drafters felt that the resulting reduction in quota 
was unfair to those waiting on the quota list. 
44 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY Acr 71-72 (1954); cf. Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643 (1953), where the writer 
states at 690: "Although it is hard to believe that Congress meant to disqualify those who 
make weekend trips to Canada or Mexico, courts will find it difficult to interpret the 
statute otherwise.'' 
45 E.g., Matter of C., 8 I. &: N. Dec. 549 (1960). 
46 Matter of J. M. D., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 105 (1956). 
4-7 Mccleod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960). 
48 See generally GoRDON &: RosENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 7.9d(6). 
49 Hearings Before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1576 (Comm. Print 1952), quoted in WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 212. 
50 S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952). See also Matter of M., 5 I. &: N. 
Dec. 261 (1953). 
51 See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 600 (1950). 
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The sponsors of the bill apparently overlooked the possibility 
of eliminating unfairness to those on the waiting list by merely 
dropping the charge-off provision for suspensions. If this were 
unacceptable, it would still be possible to deter future abuse by 
making the more stringent hardship test applicable only to those 
aliens deportable for illegal entry. The statute as drafted applies 
to all suspension applicants. 
As expected by the drafters, the Board adopted a stricter view 
once the new language became effective.62 An early opinion63 listed 
the factors to be considered in reaching a decision as to hardship 
as: 
(a) Length of residence in the United States; 
(b) Family ties; 
(c) The possibility of obtaining a visa abroad; 
( d) The financial burden on the alien of having to go abroad 
to obtain a visa; 
(e) The health and age of the alien. 
None of these has been considered as conclusive in subsequent 
decisions, and the impact of each is difficult to appraise, for the 
Board is likely to discuss those which support its decision and not 
mention the others. 
It is possible, however, to discern some rough benchmarks in 
the decisions. The alien with several decades of residence in this 
country has a good chance of making out a claim of hardship.61 
The existence and nature of any family ties which the alien has 
within the United States are somewhat less important than other 
factors.65 Moreover, if the alien has left his wife and children 
abroad his chances of showing hardship are slim.56 The Board 
r;2 Ironically, one of the reasons given by the drafters in 1955 for a suggested change 
of language to substitute the words "extreme hardship" for the current verbiage was 
that the Board had not been sufficiently "liberal" in its decisions to prevent hardship 
to many aliens. STAFF REPoRT 35, 47. 
r;s Matter of S., 5 I. &:. N. Dec. 409 (1953). 
5¾ Suspension granted: Matter of M., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 147 (1956) (24 years); Matter 
of Z., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 419 (1953) (29 years); Matter of S., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 409 (1953) (28 
years); Matter of H., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 416 (1953) (25 years); Matter of U., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 
413 (1953) (16 years). Suspension denied: Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 
1960) (17 years); Asikesc v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (14 years); Matter 
of C., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 608 (1957) (81/2 years); Matter of V., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 348 (1956) (9 
years); Matter of S., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 695 (1954) (8 years). 
rm Suspension granted: Matter of P., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 421 (1953) (wife and children in 
U.S.); Matter of H., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 416 (1953) (no family); Matter of U., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 
413 (1953) (wife, three children and mother-in-law); Matter of S., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 409 
(1953) (no family); Matter of B., 2 I. &: N. Dec. 627 (1946) (wife and children). But see 
Kam Ng v. Pilliod, supra note 54 (no family, suspension denied). 
56 Suspension denied: Matter of C., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 608 (1957) (wife and children in 
360 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
previously placed a great deal of emphasis on whether or not the 
alien's national quota was oversubscribed so as to make it difficult 
to obtain a visa if he were allowed to depart voluntarily.57 This 
factor may be de-emphasized following recent court decisions sug-
gesting that the Board's use of this factor was an unpermissible 
attempt to graft a new requirement onto the statute.58 The finan-
cial burden criterion is difficult to evaluate, as is the age and health 
test.59 However, it can be said that the alien over fifty years old 
is better able to show hardship.60 
3. Good Moral Character. Prima facie it seems quite reason-
able to require that the applicant for suspension show some evi-
dence of good moral character. But, however praiseworthy the 
objective, its application has proved to be difficult and results are 
far from uniform. Prior to the 1952 act many felt that the Board 
and some courts had tended to err on the side of leniency.61 
The McCarran-Walter Act sought to make the standard more 
stringent, and to increase uniformity, in two ways. First, the stat-
ute now requires the use of the same standards in determining 
eligibility for suspension as in ascertaining eligibility for natural-
ization. 62 The intent of the drafters appears to have been to pre-
serve the large body of case law which had been formed by con-
struction of the "good moral character" requirement under the 
naturalization laws.63 But Congress did not approve of all prior 
decisions, and, therefore, in order to offset these holdings the sta-
tute also provides that certain specified acts will bar any showing 
of good moral character.64 
Hong Kong); Matter of V., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 348 (1956) (same in Italy); Matter of S., 5 
I. &: N. Dec. 695 (1954) (wife in Greece). But see Matter of Z., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 419 (1953) 
(wife and children in Syria, suspension granted). 
57 Suspension granted: Matter of Z., 5 I. 8c N. Dec. 419 (1953) (quota oversubscribed); 
Matter of H., 5 I. 8c N. Dec. 416 (1953) (ineligible); Matter of S., 5 I. 8c N. Dec. 409 (1953) 
(quota oversubscribed); Matter of U., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 413 (1953) (eligible but other equi-
ties). Suspension denied: Matter of S., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 695 (1954) (quota overscribed); 
Matter of M., 3 I. &: N. Dec. 490 (1949) (eligible). 
58 Mccleod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960); Acosta v. Landon, 125 F. Supp. 
434 (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
59 See Asikese v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (alien will lose business if 
deported, suspension denied); Matter of Z., 5 I. 8c N. Dec. 419 (1953) (same, suspension 
granted). 
'60 See Matter of M., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 147 (1956) (66, suspension granted); Matter of 
S., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 409 (1953) (48, suspension granted); Matter of P., 5 I. 8c N. Dec. 421 
(1953) (49, suspension denied). 
'61 See, e.g., Matter of C., 3 I. &: N. Dec. 833 (1950). 
62 The Board, while it used the naturalization case precedents, did not feel bound 
by them. See Matter of 0., 2 I. &: N. Dec. 840 (1947). 
63 See Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
64 Section 101(£), 66 Stat. 172 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(£) (1958). The purpose was 
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(a) Habitual Drunkards. There has been little litigation on 
this point. It is not known whether this was intended to bar aliens 
who could show that their condition was due to disease rather than 
moral delinquency, but the decisions of the Board suggest that the 
cause of the drunkenness is immaterial. 65 
(b) Adultery. The question of what types of sexual behavior 
are compatible with "good moral character" has plagued the 
courts for years under the naturalization statutes. 66 Results were 
highly divergent, with some courts reacting instinctively against 
finding any sort of extramarital sexual escapades to be consistent 
with good morals,67 and others (notably the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit) striving to effect some sort of compromise be-
tween the findings of Dr. Kinsey and the traditional mores.68 This 
quandary was also reflected in decisions of the Board. 69 
Making "adultery" a bar has not clarified matters, for nowhere 
in the statute is the term defined. Perhaps Congress intended to 
reach all forms of sexual misbehavior, but there are no clues in 
the legislative history. 10 Some cases have used a lay or Biblical 
meaning and held that only married aliens fall under the bar.71 
Other courts, taking note of the expressed congressional desire 
for uniformity, have applied the common-law definition.72 
The Board of Immigration Appeals has been less concerned 
with uniformity, taking the position that the correct definition of 
adultery is to be found in the law of the state where the alleged 
act took place.78 It became necessary to be more specific as to the 
applicable law since many states have one definition in their crim-
inal code and an entirely different concept in their divorce law. 
The Board, reasoning that deportation was a civil proceeding, 
held that the civil definition applied.74 
Only one point seems clearly resolved: "technical adultery" 
to obtain some uniformity in decisions. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). 
See also Note, 66 HARv. L. R.Ev. 643, 712 (1953). 
65 E.g., Matter of H., 6 I. & N. Dec. 614 (1955). 
68 See LoWEN5I'EIN, THE .ALIEN AND TilE IM.MIGRATION LAW 263-64- (1958). 
61 See, e.g., Petition of Dobric, 189 F. Supp. 638 (D. Minn. 1960); Calo v. United 
States, 400 I11. 329, 79 N.E.2d 619 (1948). 
68 See Matter of W. Y. S., 6 I. & N. Dec. 801 (1955). 
69 E.g., Matter of 0., 2 I. 8: N. Dec. 840 (1947). 
70 See note 22 supra. 
71 See Evans v. Murff, 135 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1955); Matter of N., 7 I. & N. Dec. 
96 (1956). 
72 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Zacharias v. Shaughnessy, 221 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1955). 
73 See Matter of R. L., 7 I. & N. Dec. 175 (1956). 
74 See Matter of P., 7 I. 8: N. Dec. 376 (1956); Matter of M., 7 I. 8: N. Dec. 156 (1956). 
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is no bar.75 This term originally applied to the situation where a 
man and woman cohabit under color of a marriage that is legally 
imperfect. It has, however, also been applied to cases where the 
parties, thinking both are single, carry on an affair which turns 
out to be adulterous because one or both are still married. At 
first the Board held that this extension was permissible only where 
the alien was single, reasoning that everyone was bound to know 
his own marital status,76 but this position has now been aban-
doned.77 
(c) Criminal Acts. Aliens who are convicted of or who admit 
the commission of crimes involving moral turpitude or violations 
of the narcotics laws during the specified period cannot be found 
to be of good moral character. Those aliens convicted of polyg-
amy, prostitution or smuggling other aliens into the country 
are also barred. A later amendment to the act made certain ex-
ceptions for those convicted of "petty crimes."78 Furthermore, a 
pardon or expungement under state statute removes the bar.711 
It makes no difference that the statute which the alien is con-
victed of violating is not generally enforced or that the alien admits 
violating a statute that is not enforced at all.80 He still may be 
found not to be of good moral character. There may be one excep-
tion: in cases involving sexual misconduct which does not fall 
within its definition of "adultery," the Board has in no case gone 
on to consider whether the alien is in violation of local criminal 
law and hence barred under this section. It is not clear whether 
this is oversight or an application of the doctrine of desuetude. 
(d) Gambling Income. An alien whose income is derived prin-
cipally from illegal gambling activities cannot be found to be of 
good moral character. In a recent interpretation the Board held 
that "derived principally" referred to the period during which the 
75 See In re Schlau, 136 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1943); In re Mayall, 154 F. Supp. 556 
(E.D. Pa. 1957); Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
76 See Matter of N., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 96 (1956). 
77 See Matter of U., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 380 (1956); Matter of M. A., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 365 
(1956). 
78 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1958), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (Supp. 
III, 1962). See matter of M., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 147 (1956) (possession of slugs). 
79 See Matter of H., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 249 (1956); Matter of H., 6 I. &: N. Dec. 619 (1955). 
80 Petition of Orphanidis, 178 F. Supp. 872 (N.D.W. Va. 1959) (liquor laws); United 
States v. Gerstein, 284 Ill. 174, 119 N.E. 922 (1918) (Sunday closing law); Matter of 
S. K.. C., 8 I. &: N. Dec. 185 (1958) (gambling laws). But see In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561 
(E.D. Wis. 1910) [same offense held immoral in Chicago (United States v. Gerstein, 
supra), here held moral in Milwaukee]. See also Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 40, 61 (1961), finding an implicit recognition of the concept of desuetude 
in the opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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alien was employed in gambling, and not the entire period for 
which good character must be shown.81 Thus an alien who worked 
for six months as a dealer in a fan-tan house could not average out 
these earnings over the five-year period. It was enough that his 
entire income for the six-month period was earned in a gambling 
establishment. 
The Board went on to state that income was derived from 
gambling within the meaning of the statute if it accrued: (1) 
from the alien's financial interest in a gambling establishment, 
(2) through the alien's own gambling activities, or (3) from em-. 
ployment in a gaming establishment in a job which has some 
proximate relationship to gambling activities. . 
(e) Conviction of Two or More Gambling Offenses. There has 
been little litigation under this provision, and it is therefore not 
known whether it was intended merely as a supplement to the 
preceding section, so as to make it easier to bar the professional 
gambler, or whether offenses involving penny ante poker and 
bingo will also be proscribed. 
(f) False Testimony. False testimony given for the purpose of 
obtaining benefits82 under the act will also disqualify an alien, 
whether or not the deception succeeds.8~ At one time the Board 
went so far as to hold that use of an identification card that did not 
belong to an alien constituted false testimony.84 Now, however, 
the Board agrees with the courts85 that only sworn, 86 oral state-
ments87 are encompassed. · 
Where the alien retracts, during the course of the testimony, 
false statements he has just made, the Board holds that there is 
no bar.88 One court, however, relying on the section of the statute 
relating to one who "is or was" a person who gave false testimony, 
has reached a different result. 89 
(g) Confinement in a Penal Institution. If the alien has served 
81 Matter of S. K. C., supra note 80. 
82 Benefits include suspension of deportation, Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d 
Cir. 1960); citizenship, Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1959); a duplicate 
certificate, Matter of G. L. T., 8 I. &: N. Dec. 403 (1959); visa for a wife, Matter of 
W. J. W., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 706 (1958); and an extension of stay, Matter of Z., 5 I. &: N. 
Dec. 514 (1953). 
83 See Matter of L. D. E., 8 I. &: N. Dec. 399 (1959); Matter of Z., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 
514 (1953). 
84 Matter of 0., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 486 (1957). 
SIS See Sharaiha v. Hoy, 169 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
86 See Matter of G., 6 I. &: N. Dec. 208 (1954). 
87 See Matter of L. D. E., 8 I. &: N. Dec. 399 (1959). 
ss See Matter of M., I.D. No. 1113 (1960). 
so Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1959). 
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over 180 days as a convict during the period in which he must 
show good moral character he is barred, regardless of when the 
crime took place.90 This adopts the reasoning of some early natu-
ralization cases that one who is not a free agent does not show his 
true character,91 although this thinking had been rejected in other 
cases.92 
The few decisions under this provision have held that a par-
don will remove the disabling effect of imprisonment.93 The 
Board has, on the other hand, decided that the confinement need 
not be in a prison in this country and that the fact that the pris-
oner was a citizen at the time makes no difference, where he is 
subsequently denaturalized.94 
(h) Murder. A conviction of murder, in any degree, now· 
serves to bar an alien from showing good moral character for 
naturalization or suspension cases.95 The older naturalization cases 
had split over the effect of a killing on the character require-
ment; 96 some courts were willing to consider all the circum-
stances, 97 but others looked at no more than the name of the 
crime.98 The 1952 act resolved this divergence. 
One question not completely answered is whether, as the words 
seem to imply, a murder conviction is a perpetual bar, even if par-
doned. If the pardon occurs during the period for which good 
moral character is required, it will not erase the bar.99 However, 
one court has reserved the question of the effect of a pardon ante-
dating that period. 100 
(i) In General. If the alien is not barred by any of the preced-
ing provisions, he must then proceed to show good moral character 
as enunciated in literally hundreds of cases decided under the na-
turalization laws.101 Faced with the almost impossible task of 
90 As to what constitutes conviction, see Arrellano-Flores v. Hoy, 262 F.2d 667 (9th 
Cir. 1958). 
91 E.g., Petition of Ferro, 141 F. Supp. 404 (M.D. Pa. 1956). 
92 See Daddona v. United States, 170 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1948); Petition of Sperduti, 
81 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1949) (parole). 
93 See Matter of H., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 249 (1956). 
94 See Matter of B., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 405 (1957). See also Matter of C., I.D. No. 1185 
(1962). 
95 See Petition of De Angelis, 139 F. Supp. 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). 
96 Compare In re Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Pa. 1951), with In re Caroni 
13 F.2d 954 (N.D. Cal. 1926). 
97 See, e.g., Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); In re Bespatow, 
100 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Pa. 1951); cases cited in note 82 supra. 
98 E.g., In re Ross, 188 Fed. 685 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911). 
99 See In re Siacco's Petition, 184 F. Supp. 803 (D. Md. 1960). 
100 Taylor v. United States, 231 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1956). 
101 See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244 (1952). 
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finding a common ethic for a pluralistic society it is natural to 
find courts expressing opinions in terms ranging from religious 
fundamentalism102 to sociological pragmatism.103 
Although seldom phrased in these terms, the root of the di-
lemma seems to lie in the uncertainty as to whether Congress 
meant for the alien to be judged by what people actually do when 
faced with a moral decision. This appears most clearly in cases of 
sexual misconduct, an area in which there is a substantial body 
of data on both the verbalized norm and actual performance. 
While the inclusion of "adultery" as a specific bar might be in-
dicative of congressional intent to impose a moral standard ir-
respective of community behavior, the law is still unsettled. 
There are only two consistent notions expressed in the cases, 
and these are only slightly less abstract than the statute itself. The 
opinions almost uniformly state that in judging moral character 
the court looks not at its own moral code but at that of the com-
munity at large.104 Perhaps some of the inconsistencies in judicial 
opinions are attributable to variations in local views of morality 
from one judicial circuit or district to another.105 Further it is 
held that when applying this standard, perfection is not required 
-an occasional slip is consistent with good moral character. 
The judicial determination of good moral character is, at best, 
a highly subjective guess. No court has followed the suggestion of 
the late Judge Frank that objective evidence of the national moral 
standard be produced.106 As Judge Learned Hand pointed out, this 
merely shifts the issue to one of who should be polled and how the 
opinion of the prostitute should be weighted vis-a-vis that of the 
clergyman.101 Nor are affidavits as to the character of the alien 
helpful; a participant in the infamous Appalachin underworld 
102 See cases cited in note 67 supra. 
103 See United States ex rel. Exarchou v. Murff, 265 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1959); Repouille 
v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); Petition of Kielblock, 163 F. Supp. 687 
(S.D. Cal. 1958). 
10! See Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1961); Schmidt v. United 
States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949); Petition of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947). In 
addition, the Board will make allowances for the mores of the community in which 
the affair took place. See Matter of W., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 586 (1953). It has been suggested 
that the correct test is the mores of the country generally. Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 
643, 711 (1953). But this is difficult for the alien who can judge the national ethic only 
from what he observes in his own community. 
lOIS One court has held that it is sufficient if the alien's conduct measures up to 
either of the two standards mentioned in note 104 supra. In re Mayall, 154 F. Supp. 
556 (E.D. Pa. 1957). This has the advantage of protecting the alien regardless of how 
he responds to quirks in local law. 
106 Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion). 
101 Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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conclave was able to produce thirteen witnesses and 161 affidavits 
testifying to his good moral character .108 
Though overshadowed by the difficulties relating to the stand-
ard, a determination of the facts raises problems too. The alien 
bears the burden of proof, which may be quite heavy in view of the 
use of hearsc!,y evidence by the Service.100 In some cases confidential 
information not revealed to the alien is used, although this prac-
tice is now restricted somewhat by regulations of the Attorney 
General.110 
A related question is how far into the past the Service can 
reach in seeking incidents to show character. In the naturalization 
cases the bulk of the courts were willing to look beyond the sta-
tutory period to past behavior as casting light on character during 
the relevant period.m The strength of these precedents in sus-
pension cases may be weakened by the fact that in 1952 Congress 
specifically authorized such inquiry in naturalization proceedings 
but did not do so as to suspension.112 Perhaps this implies a recog-
nition that a person can reform, or that there ought to be some 
statute of limitations on moral error.113 
III. THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
Only after successfully meeting the statutory prerequisites may 
the alien appeal to the discretion of the Attorney General, exer-
cised through his delegates, ultimately the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. This discretion is limited, not only by the statute but 
also by the impending congressional review. 
Within this somewhat narrow area of decision, the power 
given is essentially arbitrary. Nothing requires the Attorney Gen-
eral to give reasons for his decisions, 114 though in fact they are 
generally given. 
The value of these decisions as precedents is not clear. In one 
case the uniform exercise of discretion was described as desira-
ble.115 The opinion proceeded to build on that foundation to the 
10s See Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1960). 
109 See United States ex rel. Exarchou v. Murff, 265 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1959); 
Matter of C. T. H., 8 I. &: N. Dec. 105 (1958). 
110 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (Supp. 1962). See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). 
111 See Ralich v. United States, 185 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Schlau, 136 F.2d 
480 (2d Cir. 1943); In re Siacco's Petition, 184 F. Supp. 803 (D. Md. 1960); Petition of 
Ferro, 141 F. Supp. 404 (M.D. Pa. 1956). Cf. Marcantonio v. United States, 185 F.2d 934 
(4th Cir. 1950). 
112 Section 316(e), 66 Stat. 243 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (1958). 
113 See LOWENSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 66, at 259. 
114 Cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). 
115 Matter of C., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 608 (1957). 
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conclusion that relief should be denied, although the facts were 
conceded to be similar to an earlier case in which suspension had 
been granted. On another occasion the Board stated that it would 
refuse to grant relief in situations where it had been denied before 
as a matter of discretion.U6 If the theory behind the grant of dis-
cretion is that no two cases are alike and that decisions may best 
be made on subtle balancing of the equities, it would seem that 
the Board ought not to feel bound by past judgments. 
Some courts have followed this view, at least to the point of 
holding that the Board may not take a single factor and make it 
determinative of all cases in which it appears.117 Such practice has 
been condemned as a refusal to exercise discretion and as an at-
tempt to engraft further qualifications on the statuteY8 Other 
courts119 have felt, arguably erroneously, that decisions of the 
Supreme Court permit this method of exercising discretion.120 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of suspension cases is confined to narrow 
grounds. Courts have said that there is no review of discretion121 
or that the court will intervene only where there is an abuse122 
or failure to exercise discretion.123 While this view is unobjection-
able some courts have unfortunately applied the standard to the 
entire suspension case, not limiting it to the discretionary as-
pects.124 These courts have failed to note that where the Attorney 
General denies that he has the authority to exercise discretion, 
i.e., that the alien fails to meet statutory prerequisites, this is a 
legal question, as reviewable as any other.125 
The dual review function was recognized by the Supreme 
Court in a recent case.126 The Court pointed out that the appellate 
116 Matter of L., 4 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1950). 
117 See Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950). 
118 See Mccleod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960); Acosta v. Landon, 125 F. 
Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
1111 See Clair v. Barber, 258 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1958); LoDuca v. Neelly, 213 F.2d 
161 (7th Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Ciannamea v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 
1953). 
120 These courts have failed to distinguish between giving strong weight to a policy 
factor and making that factor conclusive. In United States ex rel. Hintopoulous v. 
Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957), it was the former practice which was approved. The 
latter practice is more closely akin to the prejudgment condemned in United States 
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), clarified, 349 U.S. 280 (1955). 
1.21 See United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950). 
122 Sec, e.g., United States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1950). 
123 See, e.g., Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
124 See Vichos v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
1.25 For a court recognizing this point, see United States ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 
166 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1948). 
126 United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957). 
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court had two tasks: (I) to decide whether the correct legal stand-
ards were applied to determine eligibility for discretion, and (2) 
to judge whether discretion was exercised with caprice or arbitrari-
ness. 
In the determination of good moral character this distinction 
is most easily overlooked. The fact that Congress has set some 
specific minimum standards does not indicate that the decision as 
to character beyond these standards is discretionary, not legal. It 
must be recalled that this standard is the same one which the courts 
review in the naturalization cases, and the express congressional 
~esire for uniformity requires the same review of suspension deci-
sions. 
In construing the legal standards the courts agree that de-
portation is so nearly penal as to require strict interpretation in 
favor of the alien.127 The bias toward the respondent is bolstered 
in the suspension cases by the remedial purposes of the statutory 
provision.128 The Board has echoed these sentiments129 and on 
occasion has applied them.130 Other cases, however, raise doubts as 
to just what the Board thinks is the evil to be remedied.131 
If the reviewing court finds an erroneous refusal to exercise 
discretion, all that it can do is to remand the case, ordering the 
Board to exercise its discretion.132 This has led to the practice of 
denying relief both on the legal and, in the alternative, on dis-
cretionary grounds.183 
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Our immigration laws, unlike those of other Western nations, 
make deportation mandatory, not discretionary. The relevant 
statute commands deportation whenever one of more than 700 
grounds for expulsion is found to exist. Since the 1952 law was 
more severe than earlier legislation, and since it made many aliens 
121 See Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954); Sharaiha v. Hoy, 169 F. Supp. 598 
(S.D. Cal. 1959). 
128 See Sevitt v. Del Guercio, 150 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Cal. 1957). 
129 See Matter of L. D. E., 8 I. 8: N. Dec. 399 (1959); Matter of D., 6 I. 8: N. Dec. 
285 (1954). 
130 See Matter of J. M. D., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 105 (1956). 
131 See, e.g., McCleod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960); Acosta v. Landon, 
125 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Matter of V. R., I.D. No. 1152 (1961); Matter of P., 
6 I. &: N. Dec. 788 (1955). 
132 See Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950); Dickhoff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
133 See Matter of A., I.D. No. 1145 (1961); Matter of 0., 7 I. &: N. Dec. 486 (1957); 
Matter of A., 6 I. &: N. Dec. 242 (1954). But cf. Vichos v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 45 (D.C. 
Cir. 1956). 
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deportable for acts which were neither unlawful nor grounds for 
deportation when committed, it was obvious that, without an im-
provement in the suspension provisions and other devices for 
discretionary relief, great hardship on aliens and their families 
would ensue. Further it was felt that the private immigration bill, 
the principal mode of relief prior to suspension legislation, was an 
inappropriate method of alleviating this hardship. 
Judged against this background the suspension provisions ap-
pear inadequate.134 The number of private bills continues to rise135 
until it is now estimated that one out of five bills in Congress is 
private immigration legislation.136 In 1961 the number reached 
2,207, while in the same year suspension was granted in only 128 
cases.187 
One of the major shortcomings in the legislation as enacted 
was the failure to include all deportable aliens. This may have been 
partially an inadvertent result of poor drafting in establishing the 
five classes. But as regards aliens who last entered before June 26, 
1950, the result was intentional, and highly criticized. Since those 
aliens are most apt to have strong ties in this country and only 
dim connections with their native land, it was thought ironic that 
only the gangsters and subversives among them were eligible for 
suspension after 1957. This was not the result of a bias in favor of 
less worthy aliens, but rather a recognition by the drafters that 
criminals and subversives had not formerly been eligible for sus-
pension. As to the rest of the long-term residents, the thinking was 
apparently that seven years was a sufficient time in which to have 
their status regularized, and that by placing a deadline on sus-
pension these individuals would be encouraged to come forth on 
their own. 
There are two flaws in this reasoning. In the first place not 
all deportable aliens recognize themselves as such because of the 
highly technical nature of the immigration laws as well as the 
alien's own circumstances, e.g., those who entered as infants. In 
the second place, even if the alien was aware of his status and of 
the deadline under the act, he may have also heard of the nu-
merous cases in which suspension was denied and aliens who came 
forth voluntarily were deported. 
At the other extreme from the alien who fits into none of the 
134 See STAFF REPORT 32. 
131S See 1961 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 385; WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 215. 
186 See 1958 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 382. 
187 See 1961 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 385. 
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statutory classes is the one who falls within more than one class, 
by virtue of being deportable on more than one ground. Further-
more, there are some instances, perhaps due to the complexity of 
the statutory scheme, where a single ground for deportation falls 
within two of the statutory classes. In this latter situation the 
Supreme Court has held that if the alien could qualify under the 
least rigorous requirements he was eligible for suspension.138 In 
the former situation the Board held that where the only charge 
lodged against an alien woman would place her in Class I and 
hence make her ineligible for suspension, the woman might be 
considered for suspension if she could show that she had been a 
prostitute and thus deportable for a charge that would place her 
in an eligible class.139 Recently, however, there was a suggestion 
by way of dictum that the Immigration Service might make the 
alien ineligible by a careful choice among possible deportation 
charges.140 
It is not clear what policy was thought to be served by the 
Procrustean classification, particularly when compared with the 
amorphous general requirements, the discretion granted, and the 
congressional veto retained. Perhaps a greater number of cases 
could be handled under the suspension process if all aliens were 
made initially eligible and the factors which now delineate the 
statutory classes were merely to be considered along with the other 
facts of the particular case in the exercise of discretion. 
Even under the general requirements results can appear to 
be highly arbitrary. This is especially true of the requirement of 
"good moral character." As one court has said, results turn "often 
on moral judgments unrealistic in modem society."141 If what was 
intended was an actual comparison with the common mores, the 
question would appear to be one that a jury or similar body might 
be especially suited to handle in those cases where it is in dispute. 
The major objection would presumably be cost, yet it is not read-
ily apparent that the services of a jury are necessarily more ex-
pensive than the efforts of three conscientious circuit judges. The 
additional expense, if there be such, would appear to be justified. 
Fairer treatment of our resident aliens, even though not a con-
stitutional requirement, is more in accordance with our national 
traditions. Kenneth liV. Graham, Jr., S.Ed. 
138 Dessalemos v. Savoretti, 356 U.S. 269 (1958). 
139 Matter of D., 5 I. &: N. Dec. 285 (1953). 
140 Matter of V. R., I.D. No. 1152 (1961). 
141 United States ex rel. Exarchou v. Murff, 265 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1959). 
